We examine the characteristics of accounting amounts using a sample of German 
I. Introduction
The main objective of this study is to examine and compare the quality of accounting numbers under International Accounting Standards (IAS) during [2000] [2001] [2002] with those under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] 3 .
Accordingly, we compare the characteristics of accounting amounts using a sample of investigate whether there is a change in accounting quality during these three time periods. We limit our investigation to German companies to hold constant certain institutional factors such as stock listing requirements, accounting disclosure requirements, market microstructures and regulatory environments that may confound the results, thereby strengthening the reliability of our findings. Prior research has compared properties of accounting numbers using samples of German companies (e.g., Hung and Subramanyam 2007; Bartov and Kim 2005; Barth et al. 2008 , Barth et al. 2006 . Our study differs from prior research on quality of IAS and IFRS accounting measures in that we examine the change in quality of accounting caused by the revisions made to IASs and the development of new IFRSs. This study compares the characteristics of accounting amounts using a sample of German companies reporting under IAS during 2000 -2002 , and IFRS during 2003 -2004 -2006 . Specifically, we investigate whether there is a change in accounting quality during these three time periods as IASB revises existing IAS and issues new IFRS to formulate a set of high quality international accounting standards for global financial reporting purpose.
Contrary to our expectations, our results suggest a decrease in accounting quality after the mandatory EU adoption of IFRS. We find that earnings and book value of equity are becoming less value relevant during the IFRS periods compared to the IAS period. Our findings on earnings smoothing and timely loss recognition largely corroborates our findings with respect to the value relevance of accounting information. Our results
indicate that accounting quality has not improved but worsened over time. Further analysis shows that this is less likely to be driven by new adopters of IFRS in 2005 and more by the change in international accounting standards. When using a matched sample we cannot find any clear indication of either an improved or a worsened quality of financial reporting. We also analyzed the voluntary and the mandatory adopters in the period 2005 to 2006. We found only weak indications that the decrease in quality was caused by the mandatory adopters. Furthermore, we also investigated whether our results were driven by a new dominating industry group, Financials. We find nothing supporting that this is the case and our interpretation is that the decrease in accounting quality is driven by the revisions of IASs and the addition of new of IFRSs around the time of the European mandatory adoption. Contrary to the intention with the European adoption of IFRS, this might make it harder for investors to base their decisions on the accounting information.
Our primary contribution is that we exclusively examine the impact of international standards over time on accounting quality and value relevance of accounting measures as these standards go through revisions and new standards are issued. No study, to our knowledge, has empirically examined this issue. Our second contribution is that we include more recent data and investigate the effects of the mandatory EU adoption of IFRS since 2005 on accounting quality.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the development of international accounting standards over time. Section III briefly discusses prior research and develops hypotheses. Section IV discusses the research design and how we examine earnings smoothing, timely loss recognition and value relevance over time. Section V describes the sample, and the sample selection criteria.
Section VI presents our findings while Section VII concludes.
II. The Development of International Accounting Standards over Time
During the period of our investigation, a number of revisions to International Accounting Standards took place. These changes are summarized in Table 1 
II. Prior Research and Hypotheses Development
As noted earlier, some recent studies compare IAS accounting measures to those under other GAAPs. Hung and Subramanyam (2007) compare the financial statement effects of using IAS to those using German GAAP for a sample of German companies that elected to adopt IAS by examining these companies' restatements of prior years accounting numbers in the adoption year. They find that the adjustments between the two reporting systems are value relevant for book values of equity, but not for earnings.
But they do not find any difference in value relevance of book value of equity and earnings under IAS and German GAAP. They also find that total assets and book value of equity are significantly higher under IAS and that there is a higher variability in book value of equity and earnings under IAS. Finally, they find that IAS adopters exhibit larger loss provisions. Bartov et al. (2005) also examine and compare the value relevance of earnings based US GAAP, IAS and German GAAP. They, on the other hand, find that IAS earnings are more value relevant than those based on German GAAP. The difference in the results of these two studies may be found in that Bartov et al. (2005) exclude loss-firm observations in their estimations while these are included in the Hung Subramanyam (2007) study. Jermakowicz et al. (2007) examine German companies' adoption of IFRS and US GAAP over the period 1995 to 2004. Specifically, they investigate the usefulness, proxied as value relevance, before and after the adoption of these GAAPs and the perceived benefits and costs related to the process of implementing IFRS among the DAX-30 companies. 4 They find a significant increase in the value relevance of earnings after the adoption of these GAAPs. They also find that the key challenges related to the adoption of IFRS are the complexity of IFRS, the costs involved, and the lack of implementation guidance. The challenges related to the adoption of IFRS documented by Jermakowicz et al. (2007) and Soderstrom and Sun (2007) may explain the findings of Christensen et al. (2007) . Christensen et al. (2007) investigate the change in earnings management and timely loss recognition among German firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS and those who wait until the adoption of IFRS is mandatory. They find that companies that voluntarily adopt are less prone to earnings management and recognize losses more timely compared to those that resist and wait until the adoption of IFRS becomes mandatory. They interpret their findings as a sign of how certain companies (i.e.
insider oriented companies) have less incentive to adopt IFRS since they will not benefit and the challenges involved are considerable.
Finally, Barth et al. (2008) also study IAS adopters from a number of countries, whereof Germany is one of the countries with greatest representation in the sample.
They find that firms that adopt IAS are less prone to engage in earnings smoothing and recognize losses more timely.
There are also other recent studies on the effect of German and other GAAPs' on accounting quality and cost of capital. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) investigate the bidask spreads, trading volume, and stock return volatility as proxies for the information asymmetry part of cost of capital. Comparing the above proxies for German companies which switch from German GAAP to either IAS or US GAAP, as they predict, they find that the bid-asked spread decreases, and the trading volume increases, however they find no reduction in stock return volatility. Daske (2006) Contrary to expectations, they also find that companies from countries where earnings management is more common exhibit a lower information asymmetry component compared to other groups of countries. They interpret this result as income smoothing reduces information asymmetry.
Overall, the results of these studies do not provide clear evidence on how the recent development in the global accounting standards impacts the quality of the accounting amounts. For instance, Barth et al. (2008) and Jermakowicz et al. (2007) cover a period including both IAS and IFRS data, which makes it difficult to interpret their results regarding the impact on accounting quality as the international accounting standards go through changes over time. In addition, the fact that Bartov et al. (2005) exclude loss-firm observations and obtain a result different from Hung and Subramanyam (2005) suggests that certain characteristics of the companies reporting under international accounting standards may drive the results. This notion is supported by the findings of both Jermakowicz et al. (2007) and Christensen et al. (2007) . Jermakowicz et al. (2007) results suggests that the value relevance of earnings increases after companies adopt IFRS or US GAAP, a notion that make sense considering the sample used in the study (DAX-30 companies), a set of companies that are most likely to be able to cope with the complexity of implementing these GAAPs. They also find that, in spite of these companies' ability to cope with an adoption to a more complex GAAP, they still find the adoption of IFRS to be a major challenge due to its complexity, high cost, and the lack of implementation guidance. Christensen et al.'s (2007) results suggests that companies that have an incentive to implement a more challenging GAAP are more likely to maintain a higher accounting quality (proxied as earnings management and timely loss recognition) compared to those who do not.
We assume that the recent developments in the international accounting standards have led to changes in the quality of financial reporting over time. Therefore, the question remains whether the accounting quality is higher as a result of the IASB's initiatives and actions. As the IASB reduces the allowable alternative accounting methods and choices and provides a more consistent approach to accounting measurement for the goal of developing a single set of high quality international accounting standards, we predict that these changes in recent years improve the quality of accounting as evidenced by higher value relevance of earnings and book value of equity, less earnings smoothing, and more timely recognition of losses.
With respect to value relevance, we expect to see higher association between stock prices and earnings and book value of equity for firms with higher quality of reported accounting numbers. Moreover, we expect that firms with less earnings smoothing will exhibit more variability in change in net income, a higher ratio of the variability of change in net income to variability of change in cash flow, a less negative correlation between accruals and cash flows and less frequency of reporting small positive earnings as the accounting quality improves. With respect to timely loss recognition, we predict that firms with higher accounting quality show a larger frequency of large losses.
III. Research Design
We follow Barth et al. (2008) Four measures of earnings smoothing are used in this study. They are the variability of the change in net income, the ratio of the variability of the change in net income to the variability of the change in operating cash flows, the correlation between accruals and cash flows and the frequency of small positive net income (Lang et al. 2005; Barth et al. 2006 Barth et al. , 2008 . Our first earnings smoothing metric is the variability of the change in net income scaled by total assets, ∆NI (Barth et al. 2006 (Barth et al. , 2008 Lang et al. 2006 ). To control for other economic factors that affect earnings variability unrelated to the financial reporting system, we regress ∆NI on a number of control variables identified in prior literature (Ashbaugh 2001; Pagano et al., 2002; Lang et al., 2003; Tarca 2004; Lang et al. 2006; Barth et al., 2006 Barth et al., , 2008 , and the variances of the residuals of the regression is our measure of the earnings variability. The ∆NI is estimated as follows:
. We estimate equation (1) pooling observations in each of the three time periods examined and compare the variances of the residuals of the regression for each time period using a two-tailed variance ratio F-test.
Our second measure of earnings smoothing is the ratio of the variability of the change in net income, ∆NI, to the variability of the change in operating cash flows, ∆CFO (Barth et al., 2006; Lang et al., 2006) . ∆CFO is the change in cash flows scaled by total assets. As with ∆NI, to control for other economic factors that affect cash flows variability unrelated to financial reporting system, we regress ∆CFO on a number of control variables similar to equation (1) 
The variability of the change in cash flows is the variance of residuals from equation (2).
Then the second measure of earnings smoothing is the ratio of the variability of ∆NI to the variability of ∆CFO. The rationale for using this ratio is that it is plausible that the variability of net income is affected by the firm-specific volatility of cash flows and by using the ratio we control for this (Barth et al. 2006 (Barth et al. , 2008 Lang et al. 2006) . We measure the difference between these ratios across time periods using ranksum test of the permuted dataset.
The third measure of earnings smoothing is the spearman correlation between accruals and cash flows. As with the previous tests, to control for economic factors unrelated to earnings smoothing, we run separate regressions of accruals and cash flows on the control variables as included in Equations 1 and 2, except CFO. We then compare and test the correlation of the residuals from equations (3) and (4) between the three time periods based on Cramer's (1987) In addition, we also use Basu's (1997) reverse regressions of earnings on a dummy variable for bad news (negative returns), annual return, and an interaction variable of return and the dummy variable for bad news. We expect that more timely loss recognition will result in a larger coefficient on bad news earnings. We compare the magnitude of the interaction coefficient across the three periods to evaluate the timeliness of bad news reflected in earnings. A larger coefficient indicates more timely loss recognition.
The test of relative value relevance is based on a valuation framework provided by Ohlson (1995) where a firm's share price is a function of both earnings and book value of equity.
where P it is the market price per share three months after fiscal year end in year t of company i , and E it , and BVE it are earnings before extraordinary items, and book value of stockholders' equity per share, respectively, and ε it is the other value-relevant information of company i in year t. The regression model's R 2 indicates the strength of the association between the respective accounting variable(s) and stock price.
We also use a reverse regression with earnings as the dependent variable and returns as the independent variable. We expect that if losses are recognized in a timely manner, the association between returns and earnings is stronger, mirroring that more information about earnings reaches the equity market on in the period the loss occurs and not later (Basu 1997) . Hence, we predict an increase in the association between earnings and return over the three time periods under investigation.
IV. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
The initial sample consists of all industrial German listed companies found in the 
Earnings Smoothing
As reported in Table 5 , Panel A, the results of the tests of earnings smoothing are contrary to our expectations in some instances. The variability in the change in net income, ∆NI*, does increase significantly between the IAS and the IFRS voluntary periods, however, there is a significant decrease between the IFRS voluntary and the IFRS mandatory periods, suggesting an increase in income smoothing behavior. We also control for the firm-specific volatility in cash flow from operations by using the ratio of income variability and cash flow from operations variability. As predicted, the variability increases significantly between the IAS and the IFRS voluntary periods but decrease sharply and end up below the IAS level in the IFRS mandatory period, however, in this test the difference is statistically significant on the 5% level. Once again, this suggests an increase in income smoothing behavior. The correlation between the residuals from the regression on accruals (ACC) and cash flow from operations CFO shows an increase in the magnitude of the negative correlation indicating a significant increase in earnings management across the three periods. It should be noted that the correlation between ACC and CFO is positive in the IAS period. We interpret this as a sign that companies are growing and the growth is driving both an increase in CFO and a buildup of accruals.
This notion is also confirmed by the measure of growth that was significantly larger in this period compared to the later two. Finally, there is no significant difference between the small positive income variable (SPOS) across the three periods.
Timely Loss Recognition Tests
Table 5, Panel B shows a significant decrease in the reporting of large negative earnings. As previously pointed out, the change in reporting of large negative earnings may be the result of an improvement of the economic conditions since the IAS period.
However, most of our tests support the notion that the quality of accounting has decreased among German companies reporting under IAS and IFRS over time.
Furthermore, the coefficient of the interaction variable of return and bad news shows a significant increase between the IAS period and the IFRS voluntary period, as predicted.
However, there is a significant decrease between the IFRS voluntary period and the IFRS mandatory period indicating less timely loss recognition. This also may have something to do with the number of new adopters in the IFRSmandatory period.
Value Relevance Test
We measure value relevance in terms of the ability of accounting measures to explain stock prices. As shown in 
Sensitivity Analysis
Our findings in the main analysis may be a result of a structural change in the type of companies that report under IFRS since it became mandatory for most public companies in Germany. When IFRS was a choice, certain types of firms may have had more incentives to opt to report under IFRS than others. Germany has a large and liquid capital market, which means that large and well established companies have relatively less incentive to switch to IAS/IFRS to attract foreign investors since they can raise capital reporting under German GAAP. However, small information technology and less well established companies may not have the same access to the German capital market, and therefore, have reasons to switch to IAS/IFRS to be able to raise capital. Also, as shown in Table 4 , the distribution of companies in different industries changed between the IFRS voluntary periods when the Electronics industry dominated and the IFRS mandatory period when the financial sector became dominating.
In order to examine whether a self-selection bias in our pre-2005 sample drives the results we also rerun all tests using a sub-sample consisting of companies with firmyear observations in both the IAS and the IFRS period. This sample has 159 observations (92 companies) for the IAS period and 92 observations (92 companies) for the IFRS voluntary period and 90 observations (90 companies) for the IFRS mandatory period.
As shown in Table 6 Panel A, the results for tests of earnings smoothing and timely loss recognition to some extent support the findings in the analysis using the whole sample, although the reduction in accounting quality seems to be considerably lesser. The variability in the change in net income, ∆NI*, increases significantly between the IAS and the IFRS voluntary periods but, as in the case with the whole sample, decreases significantly compared to the IFRS mandatory period. When controlling for the volatility in cash flow from operating activities, by using the ratio of net income variability and cash flow from operations variability, we find the same pattern, a significant increase between the IAS and the IFRS voluntary periods followed by a significant between the IFRS voluntary and the IFRS mandatory periods. The correlation between accruals and cash flow from operations shows a significant decrease between the IAS and the IFRS voluntary periods.
The correlation is positive in both of these periods, although it becomes negative in the IFRS mandatory , however, the change is not statistically significant. We find no significant difference in the frequency of reporting small positive earnings across the two periods.
Finally, as shown in Table 6 Panel B, we find no significant change in reporting of large negative earnings, indicative for less timely loss recognition. However, contrary to the previous measure, the coefficient of the interaction variable of annual return and negative return is significantly larger for the IFRS voluntary period compared to the IAS period. There is no significant difference between the IFRS voluntary and the IFRS mandatory periods.
Furthermore, as shown in When we analyze the earnings on returns regressions using bad news observations only we find an incremental increase in the value relevance across all three periods.
<Table 6 about here>
We conclude that our measures of earnings management, timely loss recognition, and value relevance using a matched sample are neither providing evidence of an increase nor a decrease in accounting quality between the IAS and the IFRS period.
At the time of the mandatory adoption of IFRS, there is a shift in the structure of the sample, the largest industry group was Electronics up to the end of 2004 after the mandatory adoption in 2005 the largest industry group is now the Financial. We, therefore, rerun our tests excluding financial observations in order to investigate whether the results of our main analysis is driven by companies in the financial sector. As shown in Table 7 , there is no qualitative difference in our results from these tests compared to the main analysis using the full sample.
<Table 7 about here>
In order to analyze whether our results are driven by the new adopters in 2005, we also split the sample used in the IFRS mandatory period into a mandatory and a voluntary adopter group. Where the mandatory adopters are those who waited to adopt IFRS until it was made mandatory in 2005 and those who adopted IFRS before are classified as voluntary adopters. In addition, when doing this we also excluded all adopters of U.S.
GAAP who waited to adopt IFRS until it was made mandatory. The reason for this is that we do not consider these companies as resisting the use of international accounting standards, and therefore, they are different from those companies who resist switching from German GAAP to IFRS. As shown in Table 8 , we find that there is slightly less variability in residuals of change of net income and the variability of the ratio of the variability of change in residuals of net income and cash flow from operations; however, the differences are not statistically significant. There seem to be more large negative earnings reported by the voluntary adopters but once again, the difference is not statistically significant. The only significant difference between the two groups is found in the value relevance tests, the resisters are consistently showing significantly lower value relevance in all such tests.
<Table 8 about here>
In order to establish that the any decrease in the quality of financial reporting is driven by the excluded set of U.S, GAAP adopters; we also compared these observations to the voluntary adopters. As expected, we did not find any evidence of this. On the contrary, the U.S. GAAP adopters show a significantly higher variability in change in residuals of net income (also when controlling for variability in change in residuals of cash flow from operations), a positive correlation between accruals and cash flow, a significantly lower frequency in reporting small positive incomes. However, the value relevance among these companies was lower than that of the voluntary adopters.
<Table 9 about here>
VI. Conclusion
This study compares the characteristics of accounting amounts using a sample of Germany and future research needs to establish which standards drive this development. .000 1 EPS is earnings per share at year end of the fiscal year deflated by the share price 6 months after the preceding fiscal year end. 2 BVPS is the book value of shareholders' equity per share at the end of the fiscal year deflated by the share price 6 months after the preceding fiscal year end. 3 Return is the annual return of company i at time t. 4 ∆NI is the change in annual earnings scaled by total assets. 5 ∆CF is the change in cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets. 6 ACC is earnings less cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets. 7 SPOS is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. 8 Lneg is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by total assets is less than -0.20, and 0 otherwise. 9 LEV is total liabilities divided by shareholders' equity. 10 Growth is the percentage change in sales. 11 Eissue is the percentage change in common shareholders' stock. Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 1 ∆NI* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 2 ∆CFO* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 3 Variability of ∆NI* over ∆CFO* is the ratio of ∆NI* divided by ∆CFO*. 4 Correlation of ACC* and CFO* is the partial Spearman correlation between the residuals from the ACC and CFO regression. 5 SPOS is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. 6 Lneg is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by total assets is less than -0.20, and 0 otherwise. 7 The regression is ε β β β β
where EPS is annual earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the period, R is annual return, and DUM takes on the value 1 if the return is negative and 0 otherwise. 8 The regression is ε β β β
where P is price as of three months after the fiscal yearend, EPS is earnings per share and BVPS is the book value of shareholders' equity per share. All variables are scaled by share price six months after the preceding year-end. 9 The Basu good and bad news regression is
, where EPS is earnings per share deflated by price at the beginning of the year and R is the annual return. Good news observations are those for which R is positive and bad news are those for which return is negative. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% level to control for outliers. Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 1 ∆NI* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 2 ∆CFO* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 3 Variability of ∆NI* over ∆CFO* is the ratio of ∆NI* divided by ∆CFO*. 4 Correlation of ACC* and CFO* is the partial Spearman correlation between the residuals from the ACC and CFO regression. 5 SPOS is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. 6 Lneg is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by total assets is less than -0.20, and 0 otherwise. 7 The regression is ε β β β β
where P is price as of three months after the fiscal yearend, EPS is earnings per share and BVPS is the book value of shareholders' equity per share. All variables are scaled by share price six months after the preceding year-end. 9 The Basu good and bad news regression is , where EPS is earnings per share deflated by price at the beginning of the year and R is the annual return. Good news observations are those for which R is positive and bad news are those for which return is negative. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% level to control for outliers. Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 1 ∆NI* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 2 ∆CFO* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 3 Variability of ∆NI* over ∆CFO* is the ratio of ∆NI* divided by ∆CFO*. 4 Correlation of ACC* and CFO* is the partial Spearman correlation between the residuals from the ACC and CFO regression. 5 SPOS is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. 6 Lneg is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by total assets is less than -0.20, and 0 otherwise. 7 The regression is ε β β β β
where EPS is annual earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the period, R is annual return, and DUM takes on the value 1 if the return is negative and 0 otherwise. where P is price as of three months after the fiscal yearend, EPS is earnings per share and BVPS is the book value of shareholders' equity per share. All variables are scaled by share price six months after the preceding year-end. 9 The Basu good and bad news regression is , where EPS is earnings per share deflated by price at the beginning of the year and R is the annual return. Good news observations are those for which R is positive and bad news are those for which return is negative. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% level to control for outliers. Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 respectively (two-tailed) 1 ∆NI* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 2 ∆CFO* is the variance of residuals from a regression of the ∆NI on the control variables. 3 Variability of ∆NI* over ∆CFO* is the ratio of ∆NI* divided by ∆CFO*. 4 Correlation of ACC* and CFO* is the partial Spearman correlation between the residuals from the ACC and CFO regression. 5 SPOS is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01, and 0 otherwise. 6 Lneg is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for observations for which the annual earnings scaled by total assets is less than -0.20, and 0 otherwise. 7 The regression is ε β β β β
where EPS is annual earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the period, R is annual return, and DUM takes on the value 1 if the return is negative and 0 otherwise. where P is price as of three months after the fiscal yearend, EPS is earnings per share and BVPS is the book value of shareholders' equity per share. All variables are scaled by share price six months after the preceding year-end. 9 The Basu good and bad news regression is , where EPS is earnings per share deflated by price at the beginning of the year and R is the annual return. Good news observations are those for which R is positive and bad news are those for which return is negative. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% level to control for outliers.
